

初唐文人作品中的援儒入佛以及 佛教漢化之思想背景：

以二諦論與李師政《內德論》為中心之探討

金濤*

摘要：

在佛教逐步融入中國文化的過程中，有一種頗為引人注目的現象，即佛教之概念與思想，在未經嚴格佛學訓練的文人之表述中，經常遭到扭曲，被人為地輸入一些本來沒有的意義，並被附著上一些本來沒有的表達方式。唐初文人的許多作品中，即常見此類現象，可謂借道家之名言，說佛家之義理，以傳達儒家之思想。這一現象，一方面，反映了非專業人士佛學素養之不足，而另一方面，則折射出當時士人在接受與處理外來之佛教文化時的一種可能是無意識的基本態度：即以積極入世的儒家精神，去解讀與接受淡退出世之佛家教義。這一基本態度，從一個側面反映了作為受者之中國文化，是如何以其自身之因素接受、調和、並最終同化外來文化之過程的。

關鍵詞：思想背景、佛教漢化、二諦、李師政、內德論

* 伊利諾伊衛斯理大學宗教系助理教授

The Confucian Reading of Buddhist Teaching: Two Truths, Li Shizheng and the Intellectual Milieu of Buddhism in the Early Tang

Jin, Tao *

ABSTRACT:

We sometimes recognize a curious mixture of Daoist jargons, Buddhist teachings and Confucian spirit in the writings of non-Buddhist elite. Such a mixture invites us to think about the level of familiarity with Buddhist thought on the part of these non-Buddhist elite, and the implication of such familiarity on the reception and development of Buddhism in China. Addressing these questions, this paper focuses on the non-Buddhist treatment of the Buddhist concept of Two Truth in the 7th-century China, and examines, as a case study, a treatise on Buddhism by a scholar official. It argues that the apparently flawed understanding of Buddhism on the part of the non-Buddhist elite should not be dismissed as simply the result of an inadequate doctrinal training, but must also be seen as reflecting a conscious effort to read Confucianism into Buddhism – a tendency that both underlies and shapes the indigenization of Buddhism in China.

Keywords: intellectual milieu, sinification, Two Truths, Li Shizheng, Treatise of Internal Virtues (*neide lun*)

* Assistant Professor, Religion Department, Illinois Wesleyan University

One of the major topics in the study of the sinification of Buddhism is the reception of the religion in its new cultural context.¹ The study of this reception, however, has been focused primarily on the received side, rather than on the receiving side – i.e., on how Buddhism was received and thus transformed in its new home, rather than on how this new home was prepared in the reception and transformation of this foreign tradition. As Kenneth K. Inada commented some time ago:

Indeed, the Buddhist ‘invasion’ of China has been discoursed on many times in the past..., but such analysis on the whole is limited to one-sided description of Buddhist movements in China and, consequently, does not do full justice to elements of interaction which came from the Chinese side.²

That which “came from the Chinese side,” i.e., the “receiving side,” refers, apparently, to the intellectual preparation of that new home of Buddhism – i.e., the “intellectual milieu” of Buddhism in China. It refers, in Inada’s article, to the philosophical basis in the Chinese tradition which facilitated the introduction and spread of the Indian Buddhist philosophy. More specifically, it refers to the Chinese theory about the harmonious relationship between the creative (*qian* 乾) and receptive (*kun* 坤) forces as formulated in the *Book of Changes* (*Yijing* 易經) – according to the author, this philosophical basis, or intellectual milieu, in Chinese culture prepares for the acceptance of the Indian philosophical idea about the identity between “form” (*rūpa*, or *se* 色) and its ultimate “emptiness” (*śūnyatā*, or *kong* 空).

¹ For a classical discussion of this sinification movement, see Peter Gregory, *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991).

² See Kenneth K. Inada, “I Ching Metaphysics and Buddhist Introduction to China,” in *Bukkyo shisoshi ronshu* 佛教思想史論集 (Tokyo: Daizō Shuppan, 1964), pp. 19-32.

This paper is another attempt to study the intellectual milieu for the reception of Buddhism on the receiving Chinese side. It, however, proposes a slightly different perspective. Whereas Inada looks to how the receiving side is intellectually prepared in the accommodation of a new system of thought, making itself more congenial to the guest, this paper turns its attention to how this receiving side is intellectually prepared in the rereading of the received, making instead the guest more congenial to the host. It argues that the socially pragmatic approach in the Chinese reception of Buddhism – sometimes in the inadequate form of Confucian reading of Buddhist teachings – provides a friendly intellectual milieu for Buddhism and, thus, facilitates its introduction and spread into China.

With such a purpose, this paper examines how Buddhism was received by the Chinese intellectuals of the 7th-century China (i.e., early Tang), a time of great sinification movement of Buddhism. It looks both externally and internally. Externally (in Chapter A), it assesses the largely outward perceptions and expectations of the general understanding of Buddhism. Internally (in Chapters B & C), it steps inside the conceptual world of these intellectuals by focusing on their reading of a Buddhist theory, namely, “Two Truth”, and the reading of the theory by such an intellectual by the name of Li Shizheng 李師政 (fl. 7th cent.). Such an examination, from both outside and inside, with both a general survey and a focused study, is thus designed to survey the intellectual milieu in the early Tang that prepares for the reception and transformation of Buddhism.

A. An External Look

An example at hand that may shed some light on the Chinese understanding of Buddhist teachings during the early Tang can be found in a postscript Fazang 法藏 (643-712) attached to his brief commentary on the

Heart Sūtra,³ written at the request of a lay Buddhist and scholar official named Zheng Wanjun 鄭萬鈞 (fl. 7th cent.). It contains, in addition to an explanation of the cause of writing, a brief description of Zheng's relation with the scripture, which is very suggestive in regard to our question:

From the time when he was still a youth till his hair turns gray, (Zheng) has *hold onto* the *Heart Sūtra* for tens of thousands of times, his mind freely wandering in its wondrous meanings, and his mouth chanting the magic text.

始自青衿，迄于白首，持此心經數千萬遍：心遊妙義，口誦靈文。

The meaning of this “hold onto” (*chi* 持) is particularly useful in helping us understand how the intellectuals of the time dealt with Buddhist texts. As a scholar monk highly renowned and esteemed for his profound doctrinal expertise, Fazang defines the act of “hold onto” from two perspectives: From one it means to contemplate upon the text's “wondrous meanings,” namely, the doctrinal teachings, and from the other it means to chant the “magical text.” Given the immensity of duration for the act of “holding onto” such a short text (268 characters in the Xuanzang version) as in contrast to the high frequency of the act itself, and given the peculiar appellation by which Fazang labels the *Heart Sūtra*, i.e., “magic text,” it is quite obvious that, to Zheng, this text serves more for a devotional than for a doctrinal purpose.

How well then did Zheng fare with the doctrinal aspect, i.e., the “wondrous meanings” of the text? Fazang has not made any comment on this respect, but we do find two pieces of information that may provide us with some useful hint. Toward the end of this commentary, after dating and locating its composition, Fazang makes an unusual remark about the circumstances of the composition – he wrote this commentary “during the

³ i.e., *Boruo boluomiduo xinjing lue shu* 般若波羅蜜多心經略疏, T33 n.1712.

(T 出處乃引自《大正藏》，依冊數、經號、頁數、欄數、行數之順序排列。以下皆同此。)

spare time of a *sūtra* translation (project)”翻經之暇。⁴ We can smatter here a sense of casualness and ease, usually a sign of confidence and even a lightness of attitude toward the undertaking of a task. Apparently, explaining the text to Zheng is not a task as demanding as the translation project he was then engaged, and we can also easily imagine the manner in which Fazang tolerantly allowed Zheng’s “hold onto” a share of access to the “wondrous meanings”, standing at a vastly more superior position of doctrinal understanding.

The other is found in Fazang’s biography by Zangning 贊寧:

(Fazang) wrote a commentary on the *Heart Sūtra*, which was highly esteemed in his time and widely circulated throughout the empire.⁵

著般若心經疏，為時所貴，天下流行。

If the unusual popularity of Fazang’s commentary on the *Heart Sūtra* is veritable, a circumstance that extends Zheng’s case beyond an individual example, and if the relatively easier accessibility of the *Heart Sutra* is indeed as suggested by the lightness in Fazang’s attitude, we may have reason to assume that, even though the Chinese intellectuals were familiar with Buddhist texts popular at their time, their intellectual attainment in Buddhist teachings is vastly limited, their act of “hold onto” being more devotional than intellectual.

The replies from two emperors of the Tang to the letters from the great Buddhist translator, Xuanzang 玄奘(602-664), acknowledging his gratitude to the imperial sponsorship, disclose a similar situation. Both emperors make

⁴ Yoshizu believes that Fazang was participating in the translation projects headed by Śikṣānanda 實叉難陀(652-710), but is not certain, although suspects, whether the sutra being translated is the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* 大乘入楞伽經. See Yoshizu Yoshihide 吉津宜英, “hōzōden no kenkyū” 法藏伝の研究, *Komazawa daigaku bukkyō gakubu kiyō* 駒沢大学仏教学部論研究紀要, vol. 37(1979), pp. 168-193.

⁵ Zanning 贊寧, “Zhou luojing foshoujisi fazing zhuan” 周洛京佛授記寺法藏傳, in *Song gaoseng zhuan* 宋高僧傳, vol. 5, T50 n.2061.

very humble remarks about their Buddhist learning, a humbleness that goes beyond mere displaying the regal virtue of modesty. The first, by Li Shimin 李世民(599-649), says,

We, in terms of talent, fall short of the qualities of jades, and, in terms of (learning expressed in) writing, are ashamed of the failure to be broad and thorough. And as for the inner canons (i.e., the Buddhist scriptures), (we are even) much less well prepared.⁶

朕才謝珪璋，言慚博達，至於內典，尤所未聞。

And the second, by and Li Zhi 李治(628-683), says,

(I,) Zhi, have long been (handicapped by) the want of talent and good learning and, by nature, am not (blessed with) quick-wittedness. As for the various inner canons, (I must admit that I) have almost never read any at all.⁷

治素無才學，性不聰敏，內典諸文，殊未觀覽。

The specific acknowledgement of an almost complete ignorance of the Buddhist texts carries, perhaps, literal meanings. We may attribute this acknowledgement of ignorance partly to the awe inspired by Xuanzang's status as the paramount Buddhist scholar of the time, but partly, also, to an objective self-assessment under a circumstance that the very feeling of awe for Xuanzang's learning has utterly nullified any seriousness in the two emperors' learning in Buddhism. It is not clear who actually wrote these letters, since it is also possible that those scholar officials in the court could have penned these writings. If this is the case, such an acknowledgement of ignorance immediately attains an even greater degree of representation.

These, however, are primarily indirect evidence related to the

⁶ Li Shimin 李世民, "Da Xuanzang xie yuzhi sanzang xu chi" 答玄奘謝禦制三藏序敕, *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 9.

⁷ Li Zhi 李治, "Da Xuanzang xieqi shu" 答玄奘謝啓書, *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 15.

knowledge of Buddhism on the part of the Tang intellectuals. How much do they know about Buddhism as a group? A good place to find some more pertinent information may be found in the roles the Tang intellectuals played in the state sponsored translation projects, for apparently only those deemed well versed with Buddhist teachings could be assigned to such projects. Prefaces to the Chinese translations of Buddhist texts contain much of such information. One of them, written by Xu E 徐鍔 (*fl.* 7th cent.) for the translation of *the Ratnakūṭa-sūtra* 大寶積經 is probably one of the most detailed in this regard. Xu's preface gives a list of probably the most eminent scholars – “eminent” also in terms of their Buddhist learning, one would naturally expect – of the time, and their assignments in such translation projects are quite revealing in regard to their qualifications. Based on the information provided in Xu's preface,⁸ we are able to reconstruct a rough picture of the major roles in such a project.

The most important task is of course that of the chief translator (*yi fanwen* 譯梵文者), who translates the Sanskrit text into Chinese. One of his chief assistants, the scribe (*bishou* 筆授者), is to commit the translation to paper – apparently, the chief translator is only translating orally. There are two other major assistants for the translator, one verifying the meanings of the Sanskrit original (*zheng fanyi* 證梵義者), and the other verifying the meanings of its Chinese version (*zhengyi* 證義者), respectively. However, the preface has not given sufficient explanation of what these two tasks actually are. For the former position, Xu adds that its task is to “clarify and differentiate them” (probably the meanings of the Sanskrit text) 明而辨之, while the latter, to “explore the various revealed meanings in order to demonstrate them and prove their correctness” 探諸了義, 演而證之. A possible explanation is that the former position discusses the Sanskrit text before the chief translator spells out his translation, while the latter reviews the Chinese translation to ensure its doctrinal accuracy. A fifth position, the

⁸ Xu E 徐鍔, “Da baojijing shu” 大寶積經述, T11 n.310, pp. 1b22-2b6.

organizer of words(*ciwen* 次文者), is clearly to serve only for technical purpose, i.e., he is responsible for turning the necessarily disconnected sentences written down by the scribe into a piece of coherent writing. The sixth, the linguistic stylist(*runwen* 潤文官), takes care of the elegance of the presentation. Finally, the seventh task is to “generally review” 總而閱之 the entire translation after all the previous steps have been completed. What role this last one plays is not explicitly explained, but given the presence of the third and the fourth positions, which are responsible for “meanings” of, respectively, the Sanskrit original and its Chinese translation, it is highly unlikely this position carries any more technical importance than that of an honorary supervisor which symbolizes the imperial support.

The scholar officials are assigned exclusively to the last two tasks. All other prefaces to translations offer unanimous records in terms of the role the scholar officials play. Apparently, even though these scholar officials may be somewhat familiar with the Buddhist teachings, they are not considered good enough for tasks that require thorough and rigorous training in the field.

B. An Internal Look

The first section is meant to suggest, from an external perspective, that the understanding of Buddhist teachings on the part of the Tang intellectuals is in general limited and, in a sense, inadequate. This limitedness or inadequacy will be further confirmed here in this second section, which looks internally to examine the Tang intellectuals’ Buddhist learning through the specific case of the so-called “Two Truths” theory – the teaching is Buddhist, but its reading is completely Confucian, a sure sign of such limitedness and inadequacy. In the meantime, however, this section also argues, as much as the Tang intellectuals’ understanding of Buddhism may be flawed, such a misreading(or, perhaps, re-reading) shall not be dismissed simply as a result of their incompetence. There is something more to such apparent misreading.

This section will first take a brief look at the Buddhist theory of Two Truths, and then examine the Confucian reading of this Buddhist teaching.

1. The Buddhist Theory of Two Truths⁹

In its effort to deal with the problem of suffering, Buddhism undertakes to examine the nature of existence. At the risk of drastic simplification, we may single out the notion of No-Self as the core of the Buddhist understanding of this nature: There is not one single element of this phenomenal world, whether physical or psychological, that possesses a permanent and unchanging Self. Put in other words, each and every element depends on something else for its existence and is, in its turn, depended upon by another for existence. All elements are thus interdependent and, consequently, impermanent, a nature most frequently characterized as the absence of a Self, i.e., No-Self, or, in another well-know concept, Emptiness – i.e., empty of Self.

Closely related to this negation of Self is the notion of Non-Duality. The deluded beings, deceived by their own senses and intellect, falsely believe in a substantial Self in all phenomena and, in their attachment to such Selves, inevitably make distinctions and dichotomize between things, thus falling prey to the Buddhist sin of dualistic thinking. The notion of Non-Duality, designed to reject dichotomization, addresses just such a problem. This negation of dichotomization, or differentiation, further entails the notion of Equality among all phenomena – absence of a unique Self in each element removes the possibility of duality and differentiation, thus equating all elements of the phenomenal world.

These Self-negating notions – No-Self, Emptiness, Non-Duality, and

⁹ Paul Swanson traces the development of the notion of Two Truths in China thoroughly in his 1989 book, *Foundations of T'ien-t'ai Philosophy: the Flowering of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism* (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press). The summary provided here is largely based on his discussion.

Equality – guide the Buddhists in their religious practices, demanding the rejection of activities of intellect, with language and social conventions as their two most obvious expressions, and with such activities as the results of attachment to the imagined reality of some unreal Self. Such rejection of Self is so thorough that it sometimes turns back on itself by rejecting even the rejection – for the act of rejection itself, unavoidably also an act of intellect, is inevitably susceptible to dualistic thinking and its attendant attachment to Self! Thus, this second rejection brings attention back to the significance of phenomena just emptied of its significance (i.e., its Self), making it the indispensable locale for the complete and thorough rejection of a permanent Self. In short, Buddhism rejects the idea of a permanent Self through a twofold negation or, in other words, a negation followed by an affirmation.

Such a twofold rejection reflects the basic manner in which Buddhism translates its understanding about the nature of existence into its engagement with the phenomenal world. It, accordingly, takes a twofold format, a format that emphasizes the No-Self by simultaneously reducing the phenomenal world to a state of Emptiness, and, in the same time, diverting us from the dangers of such reduction by bringing the emptied and thus negated phenomenal world back to play. Such a format gives the Buddhist understanding about the nature of existence the famous label of Two Truths – i.e., the ultimate truth that the phenomenal world of is Empty, and the provisional truth that the emptied phenomenal world has its conventional significance. It is, in other words, a simultaneous negation and affirmation.

In the discussion below, we will use Emptiness and Existence as generically referring to the two sides of this double negation, with the terms of No-Self, Non-Duality, and Equality, together with their opposites, regularly referred to as their variations in the theory of Two Truths.

2. The Confucian Reading of the Two Truths

The general tendency in the reading of the Two Truths by the Tang

intellectuals is to emphasize the distinction rather than the mutual dependence of the Two Truths – i.e., they tend to look either at Emptiness, or at Existence, but never at both sides at the same time. Such a tendency, however, is not necessarily resulted only from an inadequate understanding of the double negation, but should rather be seen as an act of convenience that places its attention on something pragmatic, rather than on something doctrinal. As we will see below, whether the scholar officials are emphasizing Emptiness or on Existence, the ultimate purpose is invariably social and practical, i.e., the ultimate purpose is to maintain the norms of society and encourage active social participation.

a. The Confucian Reading of Emptiness

Many non-Buddhists apparently take the word “Emptiness” literally in giving it a negative connotation. Actually, “Emptiness” is most frequently equated to the Daoist terms of “Non-action”(wuwei 無爲), “Pure and Tranquil”(qingjing 清靜), “Deep and Empty”(chongxu 沖虛) and is thus given the meaning of detachment from worldly or material gains. In an edict issued to ban both Daoism and Buddhism, Li Yuan uses, interchangeably, the terms “Emptiness” and “Pure and Tranquil” in his criticism against Buddhists’ failure to live a simple spiritual life, with both terms meaning the cessation of greed and desire:

The teachings of Śākyamuni give its first priority to Purity and Tranquility, (which mean) keeping aloof from the defilements of the world and cutting off greed and desires.¹⁰

釋迦闡教，清淨為先；遠離塵垢，斷除貪欲。

However, such a call for restraint from material and worldly pursuit is meant less to discourage than to encourage an active social participation, aimed, primarily, at cleansing the society of the corruptive influence of these two

¹⁰ Li Yuan 李淵, “Shatai fodao zhao” 沙汰佛道詔, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 3.

religions. If we take a look at his son Li Shimin's interpretation of Emptiness, such an intent becomes even more conspicuous.

Since Emptiness is based on the notion of No-Self, and No-Self entails Equality, Li Shimin simply reads Emptiness as the principle of compassion. In an edict ordering the establishment of temples for soldiers killed in war, he extends his understanding of Emptiness, in both Daoist and Buddhist terms, to the notion of Equality and finally to that of compassion. The sentient beings are essentially the same, he points out, and it is for this reason that the sages of both Daoism and Buddhism see all people just as their own children and bestow loving affection equally upon all:

The supreme man empties himself by erasing in mind the distinctions between other and self; the Buddhist teachings, being compassionate, merge all differences in equality. For this reason, we know that the sympathy of the supreme man knows no boundaries in all directions, and that the great compassionate Buddha bestows his saving grace indiscriminately, treating all as his own sons.¹¹

至人虛己，忘彼我於胸懷；釋教慈心，均異同於平等。

是知上聖惻隱，無隔萬方；大悲宏濟，義猶一子。

Compassion, as a concept, is both social and active in its message.

Since the notion of Emptiness is based on the notion of No-Self, it is also interpreted as the reason to eliminate one's egocentric tendency, arrogance and self-conceit. Such an attitude is easily borrowed by government officials to justify their call for the observance of the norms of society, such as humility and submission to parents or other superiors. In the specific case of the relationship between Buddhist children on the one side and their lay parents on the other side, the Chinese intellectuals decide that

¹¹ Li Shimin 李世民, "Wei zhanzhenchu lisi zhao" 爲戰陣處立寺詔, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 5.

the Confucian filial dutifulness should be given priority to the Buddhist renunciation of worldly ties. Thus, in his edict prohibiting the Buddhists from accepting obeisance from their parents and other superiors, Li Zhi admonishes the Buddhists to observe Confucian rules with a justification expressed in a heavily Daoist language and grounded on a Buddhist reasoning:

The Buddhist teachings, deep and empty, equally reject being and non-being; the supreme enlightenment, unitary and quiescent, dispenses with both other and self. (With this) how would it be appropriate (for a Buddhist) to be complacent and conceited in the spreading of the (Buddhist) Dharma? (It should be noted that even) the mind of a sage is solely focused on either parental affection and filial dutifulness. In terms of the relationship between father and son, monarch and subject, senior and junior, and (the duties of) humanity and righteousness, (Buddhism) and the teachings of Duke of Zhou and Confucius take the same direction, even though their actual tracks are not identical. It is therefore utterly unacceptable to abandon the codes of propriety and act against virtues (by accepting obeisance from one's parents and other superiors).¹²

釋典沖虛，有無兼謝；正覺凝寂，彼我俱忘。豈自尊崇，然後為法？聖人之心，主於慈孝。父子君臣之際，長幼仁義之序，與夫周公孔子之教，異轍同軌。棄禮悖德，深所不取！

In short, the Buddhist Emptiness is read as notions advocating simple and thus ethical life, compassion and thus benevolence, and humility and filiality – and is, in that sense, Confucianized in spirit.

b. The Confucian Reading of Existence

¹² Li Zhi 李治, “Sengni bude shou fumu ji zunzhe libai zhao” 僧尼不得受父母及尊者禮拜詔, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 12.

The prevalent use of the term Emptiness and its non-Buddhist equivalents does not necessarily mean that the intellectuals failed to notice the importance of the other side of the Two Truths. They clearly know that the two truths are mutually dependent and that the ultimate truth of Emptiness must be realized through the conventional truth of Existence. Actually, they have placed on this conventional truth of Existence an equally great, if not greater, importance in their reception of Buddhism. Of course, as explained previously, the emphasis on the conventional truth of Existence is also meant to suit their pragmatic needs in their respective contexts.

The Tang intellectuals were able to reformulate this emphasis on the conventional truth of Existence in their familiar terms. As illustrated previously, Daoism, apparently considered as Buddhism's Chinese counterpart or its Chinese version, is almost invariably invoked to help the explanation of Buddhist teachings. It is with just such a close paralleling of the two that Li Shimin praises Xuzang's contribution to society in making available the Buddhist Dharma to all beings through the medium of conventional truth, i.e., the translation of Buddhist texts:

We have heard that the two polarities have their images and the lives contained therein are such images that manifest the containing; that the four seasons are formless and not manifested with the changes of things through the winters and summers. For this reason, examining (lives nourished by) the heaven and earth, even the ignorant are capable of recognizing their margins, while, looking into *yin* and *yang*, the worthies and the wise can seldom exhaust the laws (of the four seasons).

That the heaven and the earth (the two polarities), containing *yin* and *yang*, are easily recognizable is due to their images (the lives)! That *yin* and *yang* (the four seasons, according to the structure of this passage), contained within the heaven and the earth, cannot be exhaustively known is due to their formlessness.

For this reason it is clear that, when there are traceable images, even the ignorant are not doubtful, whereas when the forms are hidden and unperceived, even the wise becomes benighted.

蓋聞二儀有像，顯覆載以含生；四時無形，潛寒暑以化物，是以窺天鑿地，庸愚皆識其端；明陰洞陽，賢哲罕窮其數。

然而天地包乎陰陽而易識者，以其有像也！陰陽處乎天地而難窮者，以其無形。故知像顯可徵，雖愚不惑；形潛莫睹，在智尤迷。

Li Shiming describes the relationship between Emptiness and Existence as analogous to that between the formlessness and the forms. The former is the base while the latter is its manifestation, and it is only through the medium of the latter that the former could be known. For concrete examples of such a pair, he lists the “two polarities” and their “images,” “heaven and earth” and the lives they contain, and the “four seasons” and “the changes of things through winters and summers”.

Having thus explicated the importance of the Existence in the attainment of Emptiness with this Daoist analogy, Li proceeds to highlight the great significance of Xuanzang’s translation of the Buddhist texts in the salvation of the sentient beings. The ultimate truth of Emptiness, the attainment of which is the salvation, is too profound for the sentient beings to attain, and it is the teachings contained in the Chinese translations of the sutras, as an example of the provisional truth of Existence, that provides a path leading to that goal.

To elaborate, they emphasize that the revelation of the ultimate truth or the true nature of existence, namely, No-Self, Emptiness, or Non-Duality, can only be realized through the medium of the conventional existence, which is dichotomized by nature and betrays the traits of Self and impermanence. One such example in their minds is the Buddhist scriptures. Even though the words are not necessarily the most effective way of conveying the ultimate truth, being expressions of dichotomy and marked by

Self, and of necessity sharing the fate of impermanence, they are nevertheless the only way to spread Buddha's teachings. Thus, for the benefit of approaching, even though not necessarily realizing, the truth, the words of the Buddhist texts are important provisional existence, and so is the act of their translation into Chinese.

This emphasis on the conventional truth of Existence finds its expression almost everywhere in the Buddhist-related writings by the Tang intellectuals.¹³ However, this emphasis is not only applied to the perception of language and conventions, but more importantly to the justification of an active social participation. In his memorial to the throne petitioning for the stop of building Buddha statues, Di Renjie 狄仁傑(630-700) makes a stereotypically Confucian declaration, asserting the primacy of the provisional existence in its Confucian and Chinese version:

It has been the knowledge of your subject that the top priority of government must be given to matters of man!

臣聞為政之本，必先人事！¹⁴

Such an attitude is pervasive,¹⁵ and sometimes it takes on concrete social meanings. The emphasis on the conventional truth of Existence could be seen as the basis for loyalty, because the secular heads of state are easily painted as the manifestation of the ultimate truth and any aspiration for it

¹³ For two more examples, see Li Xian 李顯, "Sanzang shengjiao xu" 三藏聖教序, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 17, and Li Baiya 李百藥, "Dasheng zhuangyan jing lun" 大乘莊嚴經論, in T31 n.1604, pp. 589b20-590b01.

¹⁴ Di Renjie 狄仁傑, "Jian zao daxiang shu" 諫造大像疏, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 169.

¹⁵ For two more examples, see Li Zhi 李治, "Da shamen Huijing ci zhi puguangsi ren ling" 答沙門慧淨辭知普光寺任令, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 11, and Jia Dunyi 賈敦頤, "Xie Can fashi jiefu shu" 謝參法師戒法書, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 161.

must be accomplished through its worldly mediation in the person of emperors. Loyalty is thus naturally called for even by the Buddhist standard.

It has been learnt that the traces of the Dao are rare and subtle and that it is on the emperor that its expression is depended. (Similarly, the essence of) Buddhism is emptiness and quiescence, and it is by the kings that its spread is accomplished.

竊聞道跡希微，立言資於敝帝；釋教虛寂，垂法依於國王。¹⁶

The Confucian virtue of filial dutifulness has been given a Buddhist expression previously with the emphasis on Emptiness. Since Emptiness is based on the notion of No-Self, it thus calls for a rejection of egocentric tendency by showing respect to parents or other superiors who are not serving in the sacred positions. The emphasis on the conventional truth of Existence gives its own explanation for being filial.

To illustrate (to the sentient beings the Buddhist truth,) the Buddha enters the parinirvāṇa; however, he still advocates the principle of filial affection. Although explaining the changes of (nature) by staying non-active, Daoism exemplifies the ceremonies of sincerity and reverence (toward parents and other superiors). This is because even the supreme Dao that surpasses all the dichotomized laws has to depend on the teachings of the Three Honored Ones, and because even the Buddhist Dharma that empties all *dharmas* still manifests itself in the Four Great Elements.

寂滅垂範，猶宏孝敬之義；無為闡化，終葉虔恭之禮。

雖道超可道，尚繫於三尊；法空諸法，猶包於四大。¹⁷

As forms of the provisional Existence, the “teachings of the Three Honored

¹⁶ Hao Chujun 郝處俊, “Sengdao bai junqin yi zhuang” 僧道拜君親議狀, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 162.

¹⁷ Yan Liben 閻立本, “Sengdao bai junqin yi” 僧道拜君親議, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 153.

Ones”, as well as the “Four Great Elements”, serve as the media of the ultimate truth.

From the discussion above, we are able to make the following propositions in regard to the intellectual milieu of Buddhism in the early Tang, with a special regard to the reception of the Buddhist notion of Two Truths: First, although the Tang intellectuals were aware of the inseparability of the ultimate truth of Emptiness and the conventional truth of Existence, they nevertheless are more inclined to emphasize one of the two; second, such an inclination evinces a strong pragmatic orientation, for whether this inclination leans toward the ultimate truth of Emptiness or toward the conventional truth of Existence, in both cases it is only used to substantiate their call for the maintenance of the norms of society and for active social participation; third, this strong pragmatic orientation is expressed in a Confucian reading, occasionally with Daoist jargons, of the Buddhist teaching!

C. Li Shizheng and His “Treatise on Internal Virtues”

(*Neide lun* 內德論)¹⁸

The first two sections present, from both external and internal perspectives, a general overview of the intellectual milieu of Buddhism during the early Tang. Such an overview is based on the examination of those intellectuals who do not necessarily possess expert knowledge on Buddhism. To further our understanding of this intellectual milieu, this section continues to look internally, but this time focuses on a scholar official who, as a lay Buddhist, is apparently better equipped in the discussion of Buddhism. This man is called Li Shizheng.

Very little is known about Li Shizheng. There is no record of his dates of birth and death. We only know for certain that he was active during the

¹⁸ In *Guang hongming ji* 廣弘明集, vol. 14, T52 n.2103.

reign of the first Tang emperor Li Yuan 李淵(566-635) in the period of *wude* 武德(618-626), during which he wrote the famous “Internal Virtues” in response to Fu Yi’s 傅毅 (555-639) attack on Buddhism. *The Complete Writings of Tang (Quantangwen 全唐文)* says he is a native of Shangdang 上黨 in modern Shanxi 山西 province. He had probably served as a local magistrate in Fugou 扶溝令¹⁹ for a certain period of time, and had subsequently worked for Li Shimin in various capacities that require good learning.²⁰

Li Shizheng seems to be somehow well trained in Buddhism. He is the lay disciple of Falin 法琳, the monk famous for his debate with Fu Yi through his “Treatise on the Destruction of Heresies” (*Poxie lun 破邪論*). He himself is known to us as the author of a small Buddhist dictionary, entitled the *Collected Terms and Meanings inside the Gate of Dharma (famen minyi ji 法門名義集)*, and, of course, also this “Treatises on Internal Virtues”. He had probably also written a treatise “The Correction of Heresies” (*zhengxie lun 正邪論*),²¹ following the example of his master, but unfortunately it has been lost.

1. The Content of “The Treatise on the Internal Virtues”

In addition to an introduction, the treatise contains three chapters. Chapter one, “Clarification of Doubts” (*bianhuo 辯惑*), deals with the ten major charges of Fu Yi²² in an effort to clarify the commonly held doubts

¹⁹ Yan Cong 彥琮, “Tang hufa shamen Fa Lin biezhuan” 唐護法沙門法琳別傳, in T50 n.2051.

²⁰ (*menxia dianyi 門下典儀*) *Datang neidian lu* 大唐內典錄, T55 n.2149, (*donggong xueshi 東宮學士*), 李師政, *Famen mingyi ji 法門名義集*, T54 n.2124.

²¹ He “also wrote two treatises, entitled, respectively, ‘Internal Virtues’ and ‘Correction of Heresies’”又撰內德正邪二論. See Yan Cong 彥琮, “Tang hufa shamen Fa Lin biezhuan” 唐護法沙門法琳別傳, in T50 n.2051.

²² Arthur Wright apparently has not consulted the “Internal Virtues” for his enumeration of Fu’s charges, for many of the charges Li responds to can not be

about Buddhism, and to explain why such erratic views are at fault and Li's own views are correct; chapter two, "Exposition of Fate" (*tongming* 通命), discusses the subject of fate, attempting to account for the fickleness of fortune with the Buddhist theory of karmic retribution; chapter three, "Emptiness and Existence" (*kongyou* 空有), presents Li's interpretation of the Buddhist notion of Two Truths and a refutation of what Li sees as the biased and one-sided view of the notion.

a. Chapter One: The Clarification of Doubts

Chapter one is a straightforward defense of Buddhism against Fu Yi's criticism. Li Shizheng simulates a debate between two fictitious figures, the Scholar of Eloquence and Insightfulness (*bian-cong shu-sheng* 辯聰書生) and the Gentleman of Loyalty and Righteousness (*zhong-zheng jun-zi* 忠正君子), in which the former presents a number of charges against Buddhism, to which the latter responds with an extended refutation by using Fu Yi's ten charges as his targets.

From the perspective of an argumentative writing, such a simulation is perhaps unnecessary, given the fact that the Scholar of Eloquence and Insightfulness only serves to introduce the charges of Fu Yi, and has neither made any contribution to the debate nor presented any significant resistance to Li's counterattack. However, by the implicit identification of Fu Yi as the Scholar of Eloquence and Insightfulness and Li himself as the Gentleman of Loyalty and Righteousness, the simulation probably gratifies the author's

included in Wright's categories. Also, since some of Fu's charges mentioned in his two extant memorials to the throne, as categorized by Wright, are not treated in Li's treatise, it seems that Li has not seen all of Fu's memorials asking for the banning of Buddhism. See Arthur Wright, "Fu I and the Rejection of Buddhism", in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XII (1951): 33-47, and Fu Yi 傅奕, "Qing chu shijiao shu" 請除釋教疏, & "Qing fei fofa biao" 請廢佛法表, both in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 133.

desire for a complete victory over the slanderers of Buddhism. Below is a summary of Li Shizheng's refutation of Fu's ten charges against Buddhism.

As a response to the first charge, one that questions Buddhism's foreign origin, Li argues that distance and location shall not prevent us from accepting something much superior to its native counterparts, though he has not really explained why Buddhism is superior to its Chinese counterparts, an indispensable basis for the validity of his argument.

Fu's second charge is that Buddhism lacks the authority that can only be granted by its placement in the Chinese tradition. To this Li responds with the following: 1. The records of tradition could not have included everything worth recording, and therefore the mere fact that Buddhism is not mentioned by the Chinese tradition does not necessarily prove its unworthiness; 2. Lateness in time does not necessarily mean inferiority; in fact, Li suggests, lateness in time usually signals superiority in the progressive evolution of a culture; 3. The eternity of the Dharma-body of Buddha places Buddhist teachings outside the temporal plane, and it is therefore meaningless to question Buddhism's authority by focusing on the late introduction of its provisional existence into the Chinese civilization.

As a response to Fu's belittling of Buddhism in favor of Daoism, Li replies: 1. The two teachings are equally based on the principle of Non-Action, with Buddhism having the slight upper hand in a better expression of the truth, it is therefore unreasonable to assign superiority to one over the other; 2. Given the identity of doctrinal basis for both teachings, Fu's denigration of Buddhism reflects his failure to conceal his sectarian partiality, a sin Li assures that he himself will never be susceptible to; 3. Daoism is the co-author with Buddhism, if not the student, of certain doctrines. If they are co-authors, it is not right to find fault with their common product; if Daoism is the student, what could have been even more wrong to denigrate one's teacher?

To the charge of evil wizardry, Li responds: 1. The evil wizardry is not compatible with the benevolent and righteous intentions of Buddhism; 2.

Those eminent monks of the past could not have be engaged in evil wizardry; 3. The governments of the past, bent upon prohibiting evil cultic practices, could not have allowed Buddhism to develop had it been so; 4. Those lofty-minded literati of the past could not have been associated with Buddhism had they found it engaged in evil wizardry.

To the charge that the great size of the Buddhist community constitutes a potential danger of rebellion in view of some of the past Buddhist rebellions, Li responds, 1. Historical precedents do not necessarily entail similar incidents of today; 2. It is impossible for the Buddhists to rebel given the scattered-ness of the Buddhist population; 3. By nature the Buddhists are not rebellious people; 4. Even though there were and are Buddhists who commit crimes, the Buddhist faith is not the source of such crimes.

To the charge that Buddhists are greedy, Li responds: 1. The very fact that the Buddhists leave the world prove that they are not greedy; 2. If the Buddhists' earnestness to attain salvation is considered greedy, then greed is not evil; 3. The Buddhist practice of disciplines prove that they are not greedy.

To the charge that shaving hair is in violation of filial dutifulness, Li responds: 1. Keeping or shaving the hair is not correspondent to being filial or unfilial; 2. If shaving of hair is indeed a breach of filial dutifulness, it is done for the sole purpose of making greater good.

To the charge that worshipping of Buddha's statues is tantamount to worshipping earth and dust, i.e., worthless things, Li responds: 1. The materials by which Buddha's statues are built are not only earth and dust, there are also metals, and the Buddha are also painted on silk and satin; 2. Building statues for Buddha is only an expression of one's devoutness.

To the charge that Buddhism is the cause of the corruption of government, Li responds: 1. The cause of governmental corruption is woman, not Buddhism; 2. The principle of Buddhism is compassion for people, instead of encouragement for corruption

To the charge that Buddhism is the cause of the corruption of the primordial simplicity of society, Li responds: 1. The loss of that simplicity appears long before the advent of Buddhism; 2. The principle of Buddhism is to encourage harmony and goodness in the society.

b. Chapter Two: The Exposition of Fate

Chapter two treats the non-Buddhist attitude toward the Buddhist idea of karmic retribution, a notion that deals with the fickleness of fortune²³. To the non-Buddhists, the Buddhist insistence that virtue be rewarded and vice punished, i.e., the notion of karmic retribution, simply does not hold any substantial ground for the fact that that is not the case in real life. The logic of this distrust includes the following points:

1. History and life experience tell them that in many cases the virtuous are afflicted with pains and sufferings while the vicious are blessed with success and other tokens of good fortune;
2. Thus, what the notion of karmic retribution sees as a direct correspondence between one's deeds and one's fortune is not tenable;
3. The attitude toward one's own deeds, though unarticulated in this chapter, thus comes to the fore: why is it necessary to watch one's own behavior and be virtuous?

These points could be seen from two perspectives: one is a perception, and the other is the attitude based on such a perception. Put in other words, if one does not perceive dangers inherent in immoral behavior, one is more likely

²³ For a detailed discussion of Li's view on karmic retribution, see Nakajima Ryūzō's 中嶋隆藏 "Rishishō no unmeiron: zuitō ki ni okeru unmeikan no tenkai" 李師政の運命論: 隨唐期に於ける運命觀の轉回 (in *Nihon chūgoku gakkai sōritsu 50-nen kinen ronbunshū* 日本中國学会創立五十記念論文集 (Tōkyō: Kyōko shoin 汲古書院, 1998), 907-19.) and Pan Guiming's 潘桂明 "Ping Li Shizheng neide lun de wenhua guan" 評李師政《內德論》的文化觀 (in *Shanghai fojiao* 上海佛教 6 (1999)).

than not to practice immorality.

These two perspectives are precisely where Li launches his counterattack. From the first perspective, one which inquires into the possible connection or correspondence between one's deeds and one's fortune, Li points out that the non-Buddhists fail to see such a correspondence mainly because they allow the range of their discussion to be restricted to one lifetime. To Buddhists, he argues, existence includes three lifetimes, i.e., past, present, and future. Given such an expansion of the range of existence, it becomes possible for all one's deeds to elicit their appropriate responses.

Based on this perception, Li proceeds with a didactic lecture from the second perspective by calling for the practice of morality. Grounded in this expanded world of existence, the response in one's fortune to one's deeds is precise and unflinching, thus the aspiration for a desirable fortune has to completely depend on what one has done in the past. However, since the response, be they rewards or punishment, have to be metered out in a span of three lifetimes, to one who is ignorant of such extended existence, such responses may sometimes appear to be not timely delivered or not delivered in exact proportions. Having thus fully prepared his listeners for the consequence of their own deeds, Li warns them against any evil-doings and exhorts them to behave morally.

c. Chapter Three: Emptiness and Existence

In chapter three Li charges his opponents of holding a nihilistic view about the Two Truths, but first he delineates the major points of his opponents. There are two levels in their argument. At the first level, they appear to be quite well versed with the notion of Emptiness: on the one hand, they emphasize the insubstantial nature of existence, namely, emptiness

The sutra compares dharmas to bubbles and shadows, and sees beings as imagined and in (constant) transformation.

經以法喻泡影，生同幻化，

On the other hand, they also take note of the idea of Non-Duality, which implies the acceptance of the provisional truth:

The sutra also says there is no distinction between evil deeds and (deeds that result in) good fortune.

又云罪福不二，

It is the insightful perception of the Mahayana that things are neither correct nor wrong.

然則無是無非，大乘之深理。

At the second level, they apply the notion of Two Truths to the interpretation of the idea of karmic retribution. From the perspective of Non-Duality, they argue, there should be no distinction between good fortune and bad fortune, and between virtues and evils. Thus they further argue that the idea of karmic retribution, warning against evil-doings and encouraging virtuous deeds by promising a punishment of bad fortune for the former and a reward of good fortune for the latter, is simply a violation of the Buddhist idea of non-distinction, and is therefore only of the order of the small vehicle. To substantiate their rejection of the karmic retribution theory, they run on with a long passage that compare one's fortune to the natural state of plants, concluding that neither the differences in the fortunes of these plants nor the differences in man's fortunes are the results of deeds. Put simply, they reject the necessity of moral endeavors.

Li's repudiation of such argument is mainly directed against what he believes to be their inadequate application of the Two Truths. Li sees no errors in their insistence on the notion of No-Self and by extension the notion of Non-Duality, what he finds fault with in their argument is the direction in which they interpret or apply the notion of Non-Duality. By Non-Duality Li does not mean that good and bad shall not be distinguished and that therefore it does not matter in what manner one should behave.

What he believes to be a correct implication of Non-Duality is that the ultimate insubstantiality of existence and the provisionality of existence is non-dual, and that the attainment of the ultimate truth can only be achieved within the provisional sphere. In the case of karmic retribution, this Non-Duality stresses the importance of conventional practices. In a religious sense, the supreme truth can only be realized through the proper meditative practices; similarly, in the social sense, the ultimate good could only be achieved through the observance of the accepted social rules. To Li Shizheng, the priority of the Two Truths should be given to its provisionality.

Next, Li proceeds to discuss the nature of this inadequacy in the interpretation of Non-Duality. Li grants that his opponents know, at least theoretically, the Buddhist notion of the Two Truths and all its ramifications; where they falter is the way they read or interpret it in relation to the notion of karmic retribution and, more specifically, to the attitude one should adopt in regard to his or her duties or obligations in society. Such an abuse of the notion of the Two Truths, Li terms as the biased view of Emptiness.

Even though they have quoted the wondrous words of the Mahayana, they really have not obtained the essence of these words. When talking, they appear to agree with the sutra, but when using the words, their minds appear to disagree with the sutra. Why? It is just because the correct words, being incorrectly used, gives rise to erratic attachment!

雖引大乘之妙言，不得妙之真致；說之於口若同，用之於心則異。
異者何也？良由反用正言，以生邪執矣！

For the rest of the chapter, Li is merely reasserting his version of the Two Truths by repeatedly emphasizing the essentiality of the provisionality in the form of defending the notion of karmic retribution. Apparently, the defense of the karmic retribution is his primary interest, while the Two Truths only provides the theoretical basis.

As supplement argument to his major discussion of the Two Truths and karmic retribution, he also rejects the criticism that the teaching of karmic retribution is of small vehicle due to its distinction between good and bad. To those who give free reign to their sensual impulses on the basis of the equality of good and bad, he warns with an assurance of suffering, and calls on them to mend their ways as the only way of deterrence. He also challenges the thought that fortune, health in this case, is determined by medicine rather than by one's past deeds.

To summarize, the title of this chapter indicates that Li intends to discuss the Buddhist notion of the Two Truths, however, a closer scrutiny leads us to think that his primary interest in the discussion of the Two Truths is far less theoretical than pragmatic. The objective Li has in mind when treating the doctrine is to reinforce his assertion on the karmic retribution discourse of chapter two and, by extension, to reinforce his exhortation on the moral behavior on the basis on the notion of karmic retribution.

2. A Thematic Analysis of the Treatise

A question immediately arises after this brief review of the contents: the three chapters of the treatise are apparently treating three different subjects, chapter one rejects Fu Yi's allegations, chapter two dwells upon the notion of karmic retribution, and chapter three discusses the doctrine of Two Truths, how then are these three subjects related, or is there an unified thesis that underlies these different issues? Put in other words, what is/are the purpose(s) of the treaties as a whole?

Li has not clearly indicated such a unified thesis in his introduction. A defense of Buddhism against charges from such opponents of Buddhism as Fu Yi is undoubtedly his most immediate purpose, but this concern appears to be treated only in the first chapter and bears no direct relationship with the latter two. Besides, Li's enumeration of some of Fu's charges takes too much a space in the introduction while allowing virtually no suggestion at all

regarding the issues of the two latter chapters. Thus, a first look at the treatise leaves the readers in quandrum as to what the overall objective Li intends to achieve. Apparently, Li is not very good at organizing an argumentative writing. Had he been so, he could have at least explained in his introduction how the discussions of karmic retribution and the Two Truths are related to his response to Fu's charges and how these two contribute to their refutation.

However, a careful review of the treatise allows us to propose a conjecture, at least tentatively, for the major objectives of the treatise. By using the plural form of the word "objective", I intend to suggest that Li's purpose should be perceived from several different aspects, which should be arranged in an order of graded immediacy and applicability to the issues of his concern.

At the most general level, Li's treatise is a direct response to the suspicions and disbeliefs of Buddhism during his time as spearheaded by Fu Yi. For this reason, although he highlights the recognition and support by the court, he could not help lamenting the fact that the mainstream literati of the time entertain a general disbelief of the Buddhist teachings.

At the second level, logically though not necessarily intended by him, Li addresses the reasons of this rampancy of the disbelief. The reason that erratic views arise is because the literati fail to acquire a correct understanding of the Buddhist truth.

What then is this Buddhist truth that they fail to understand? Though the introduction is at the best vague about this point, the very fact that he devotes one separate chapter to the notion of the Two Truths is evidence enough to show that Li blames the rampancy of such disbeliefs on the inadequate understanding of the Two Truths. Even though the disbelievers theoretically know the meaning of Two Truths, they nevertheless fail to apply the Buddhist truth correctly to the real life. Rather than drawing the conclusion that Non-Duality leads to an emphasis on provisionality and

more specifically on appropriate social behavior, they instead use the notion to deny the distinctions between good and bad and thus justify inappropriate behavior. Armed with such a false conception, they also deny the validity of the notion of karmic retribution, for if there is no distinction between good and bad, the very basis of the operation of such a system, i.e., one's fortune is a response to the one's deeds either good or bad, immediately becomes meaningless.

At the third level, Li discusses the consequences of the disbeliefs about Buddhism. The failure to apply the notion of Non-Duality results in the rejection of the notion of karmic retribution and the disruption of an accepted moral order of the society. To him, the denial of karmic retribution in the form of denying the distinction between good and evil is tantamount to a denial of the time-honored traditions. Actually, such a concern has already been clearly expressed in chapter two, where the refusal to accept the karmic retribution theory has caused grave concerns in those advocates of the moral behavior. Although chapter one is almost exclusively devoted as a response to the Fu Yi's charges, the proposal made by the Scholar of Eloquence and Insightfulness elicits a strong reaction from the Gentleman of Loyalty and Righteousness, and this reaction clearly indicates that the priority of the chapter is also given to the maintenance of an accepted moral order of the society.

Summarizing these major points, we find that although the structure of the treatise appears to be loose and do not have a clear and unified thesis, an implicitly underlying logic is identifiable: In his effort to defend Buddhism from charges as spearheaded by Fu Yi, Li finds that such charges are derived from an incorrect interpretation of Buddhist thought such as the notion of Two Truths, and further realizes that such false conception leads to the erasure of the distinction between good and bad and hence to the disruption of the accepted moral order of the society. In this sense, his defense of Buddhism against Fu Yi's charges, his reassurance of the efficacy of the karmic retribution, and his discussion of the Two Truths are all motivated by

a socially pragmatic orientation, while the subject of each of the three chapters is only contributive to that purpose.

Conclusion

As a conclusion to this study of the intellectual milieu of the Buddhism in the early Tang, I would like to make the following propositions:

First, the understanding of Buddhism on the part of the non-Buddhist elite is of a completely different order from that of the professional scholars of Buddhism, such as the scholar monks who have been engaged in serious studies of Buddhism. Their knowledge about Buddhism is heavily tinted with or tempered by their training in the Chinese traditions such as Confucianism and Daoism, and is probably better described as an expression of Confucian values with the assistance of Buddhist and Daoist terminology and theories.

Second, as implied by the first, their interest in Buddhism is motivated less by its doctrines than by its pragmatic efficacy, i.e., the talk of Buddhism by most of these non-Buddhist elite is only to serve their particular purposes in their respective contexts instead of satisfying an intellectual curiosity in the Buddhist theories.

Third, this pragmatic orientation in the non-Buddhist reception of Buddhism allows us to gauge the contributions they make to the sinification process of Buddhism. If the shift from a more negative attitude of the Indian Buddhism to a more positive outlook in Chinese Buddhism is one of the most salient features of this process, it then would not be completely unreasonable to suggest that this pragmatic orientation on the receiving side of this great cultural exchange provides a fertile soil for and thus prepares for the sinification of Buddhism.

Bibliography

1. Primary Sources

Datang neidian lu 大唐內典錄, T55. n.2149.

Di Renjie 狄仁傑. “Jian zao daxiang shu” 諫造大像疏, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 169.

Fazang 法藏. *Boruo boluomiduo xinjing lue shu* 般若波羅蜜多心經略疏, T33 n.1712.

Fu Yi 傅奕, “Qing fei fofa biao” 請廢佛法表, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 133.

Fu Yi 傅奕. “Qing chu shijiao shu” 請除釋教疏, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 133.

Hao Chujun 郝處俊. “Sengdao bai junqin yi zhuang” 僧道拜君親議狀, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 162.

Jia Dunyi 賈敦頤. “Xie Can fashi jiefa shu” 謝參法師戒法書, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 161.

Li Baiyao 李百藥. “Dasheng zhuangyan jing lun” 大乘莊嚴經論, T31 n.1604, pp. 589b20-590b1.

Li Shimin 李世民. “Da Xuanzang xie yuzhi sanzang xu chi” 答玄奘謝御制三藏序敕, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 9.

Li Shimin 李世民. “Wei zhanzhenchu lisi zhao” 爲戰陣處立寺詔, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 5.

Li Shizheng 李師政. “Neide lun” 內德論, in *Guang hongming ji* 廣弘明集, vol. 14, T52 n.2103.

- Li Shizheng 李師政. *Famen mingyi ji* 法門名義集, T54 n.2124.
- Li Xian 李顯. “Sanzang shengjiao xu” 三藏聖教序, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 17.
- Li Yuan 李淵. “Shatai fodao zhao” 沙汰佛道詔, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 3.
- Li Zhi 李治. “Sengni bude shou fumu ji zunzhe libai zhao” 僧尼不得受父母及尊者禮拜詔, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 12.
- Li Zhi 李治. “Da shamen Huijing ci zhi puguangsi ren ling” 答沙門慧淨辭知普光寺任令, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 11.
- Li Zhi 李治. “Da Xuanzang xieqi shu” 答玄奘謝啓書, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 15.
- Xu E 徐鍔. “Da baojijing shu” 大寶積經述, T11 n.310, pp. 1b22-2b6.
- Yan Cong 彥琮. “Tang hufa shamen Fa Lin biezhuann” 唐護法沙門法琳別傳, T50 n.2051.
- Yan Liben 閻立本. “Sengdao bai junqin yi” 僧道拜君親議, in *Quan tang wen* 全唐文, vol. 153.
- Zanning 贊寧. “Zhou luojing foshoujisi fazing zhuan” 周洛京佛授記寺法藏傳, in *Song gaoseng zhuan* 宋高僧傳, vol. 5, T50 n.2061.

2. Book

- Gregory, Peter. *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991.
- Inada, Kenneth K. “I Ching Metaphysics and Buddhist Introduction to China,” in *Bukkyo shisōshi ronshū* 佛教思想史論集, pp. 19-32 Tokyo:

Daizō Shuppan, 1964.

Nakajima, Ryūzō 中嶋隆藏. “Rishishō no unmeiron: zuitō ki ni okeru unmeikan no tenkai” 李師政の運命論: 隨唐期に於ける運命觀の轉回. In *Nihon chūgoku gakkai sōritsu 50-nen kinen ronbunshū* 日本中國学会創立五十記念論文集, pp. 907-19, Tōkyō: Kyōko shoin 汲古書院, 1998.

Swanson, Paul. Foundations of T'ien-t'ai Philosophy: the Flowering of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1989.

3. Journal article

Pan, Guiming 潘桂明. “Ping Li Shizheng neide lun de wenhua guan” 評李師政《內德論》的文化觀, in *Shanghai fojiao* 上海佛教 6, 1999.

Wright, Arthur. “Fu I and the Rejection of Buddhism,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* XII, 1951, pp. 33-47.

Yoshizu, Yoshihide 吉津宜英. “Hōzō-den no kenkyū” 法藏伝の研究, *Komazawa daigaku bukkyō gakubu kenkyū kiyō* 駒沢大学仏教学部論研究紀要 37, 1979, pp.168-193.

(責任編輯：釋傳法)